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1 Introduction
Typical employment contracts specify the duration and terms of employment
only loosely, leaving many details implicit (Williamson, Wachter, and Harris
1975; Chevalier and Ellison 1997,1999; Baker et.al., 2002).1 Since a third party
cannot enforce implicit contracts, in theory they may be ine cient due to moral
hazard. That is, after contracts are agreed upon, each party could take ac-
tions which undermine e ciency but cannot be fully anticipated and contracted
around. However, experimental evidence has pointed to two forces which often
lead to high rates of e ciency even in incomplete contracts: reciprocity, and the
possibility of private contract renewal conditional on good performance.
Early experiments showed that paying high wages elicits reciprocal high
worker e↵ort, thereby reducing losses from moral hazard. Reciprocation oc-
curred even when identities were anonymous and no individual reputations could
form (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl, 1993). Moreover, the introduction of
private contracting with public identification allows employers to respond to
workers’ e↵ort through a series of spot-market labor contracts that are o↵ered
specifically to an identified worker.
This creates a high-tier market populated by employers and workers who
maintain informal long-term relationships– relational contracts– with no explicit
guarantee of relationship continuation. In this market, high-wages contracts
are reciprocated with high e↵ort and the gains from trade are typically shared
equally (Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004, henceforth BFF). The high tier market
often coexists with a low tier market of “McJobs” in which employers make
public (indiscriminate) low wage o↵ers and workers who accept those jobs deliver
1Most US employers utilize ‘employment at will’ clauses, which state that either the em-
ployer or the employee can terminate an employment contract of indefinite duration at any
time, for any reason. This clause renders the terms under which termination occurs vague
and hence implicit.
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low e↵ort.2 Note that many naturally occurring labor markets also exhibit
these two tiers, in which well-paid permanent workers coexist with poorly paid
peripheral temporary workers (see Amuendo-Dorantes (2000) on Spain; Herrera
and Shady (2005) on Peru; and Lindbeck and Snower, 2001 on ”insider-outsider”
theory).
The upper tier of the labor markets that emerges endogeneously in these
experiments relies on implicit relational contracts    which are, empirically,
typically built out of a series of private worker-specific contract renewals. Given
the replicability of the BFF results in various ways, an important question is
how robust these markets are to lifelike institutional or behavioral features which
could undermine relational contracting. We focus on exogenous disruption of
the employers’ ability to hire.
Interruptions in labor demand occur often in everyday labor markets, as
workers in hospitality, entertainment, service and high-tech industries know
only too well. A manager’s intention to renew a contract with a good worker is
limited by business cycle e↵ects, layo↵s from seasonality, liquidity shocks and
foreign exchange, and changes in upper management’s priorities. In develop-
ing countries, weak legal enforcement and limited capital markets often subject
employers to exaggerated shocks, which in turn a↵ect their contractors.3 In-
cidentally, interruptions also happen in personal relationships which also have
properties of relational contracts, though such relationships are not our focus.4
Laboratory experiments provide a useful first step to investigate the impact
of temporal labor demand shocks on relational contracts. Unlike in naturally-
occurring labor markets, complicating factors (such as uncertainty about the
length or probability of interruption, informal promises to rehire workers, or
doubt about whether the downturn is real) can be controlled for in the lab. In
addition, shocks that are truly and evidently exogenously can easily be created in
the lab. In our experiment, an extension of the BFF exchange paradigm, there is
a probability in every period that an employer experiences a publicly observable
stochastic labor demand shock, which prevents hiring for three periods. 5
Intuitively, exogeneous interruptions increase the likelihood that a worker
who invested high e↵ort in the current period to maintain goodwill may find
himself not working for the same employer in the next period. In this situa-
tion, workers may be more likely to behave as if a current period is their last
2See the review in Camerer and Weber (2008) for conditions under which wages and e↵orts
are not as reciprocal (e.g., Rigdon 2002) or are sensitive to details of the environment and
subject pool (Hannan, Kagel and Moser, 2002; Charness, Frechette and Kagel 2004, Healy,
2007). Falk, Hu↵man and MacLeod (2015) show e↵ects of dismissal barriers and discretionary
post-e↵ort bonus pay to workers by employers in the BFF environment.
3For example, see Duflo and Banerjee (2000) on India.
4See Angrist and Johnson (2000) on the e↵ect of deployment on divorce rates and Vorm-
brock (1993) on job-related marital separation.
5Two other experimental papers also feature stochastic outcomes in a relational contract
setup. Fehr and Zehnder (2009) find that reputation formation is crucial for a functioning
credit relationship when stochastic outcomes impact borrowers’ ability to pay back loans.
Renner and Tyran (2004) find that consumers are willing to bear part of the cost of one-time
shocks to employers’ production costs if there is public information about the shock. Neither
paper tests the impact of direct shocks on the trading partner’s ability to contract.
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contracted period with their current employer, and shirk. Employers may lower
wages in anticipation of such defensive shirking, resulting in lower market e -
ciency.6 But stochastic interruptions can conceivably improve market e ciency.
Azariadis (1975) and Cardoso and Portela (2009) argue that employers will pro-
vide workers with de facto unemployment insurance in the event of stochastic
shocks (such as more generous wages), thus inducing positive reciprocity from
the workers. In addition, an anxious worker may attempt to insure against
burning her bridges with a current employer, in case of a downturn, by putting
in extra e↵ort in the current period so the current employer will be eager to
rehire her when employer recovers and is able to hire again.
We develop a theory that follows previous literature in assuming the exis-
tence of some known proportions of fair (non-shirking) workers and selfish work-
ers. We show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which stochastic
interruptions do introduce instability in relationships, but the high wage-e↵ort
equilibrium can persist in spite of downturns. The intuitive idea is that both
employers and workers prefer to contract with their incumbent partner, but
unmatched employers poach workers who are involuntarily unemployed because
of a downturn. These workers do not bear a ”stigma of unemployment” since
downturns are publicly known, and new employers are sensitive to whether a
downturn provides an alternative explanation for the incumbent employer’s fail-
ure to renew a worker’s contract.7
The main experimental result is that exogenous interruptions slow down
and destablizes relational contracts but the high e ciency of the labor markets
is maintained by adaptation in both firms and workers strategies . Without
stochastic interruptions, employers quickly become matched with workers and
then rely on immediately renewing o↵ers to these workers as long as they do
not shirk. This leaves only the worse shirkers unmatched (such as those in
the ”McJob” public market). Immediate renewal is increasingly di cult as the
frequency of stochastic interruption increases (going from 53% of contracts in
markets with no interruption to only 9% of contracts when interruption prob-
ability is 50%), and both employers and workers must develop new strategies
to remain productive in the market. As workers must bounce around several
employers longer, employers must be even more discerning about who they hire.
Loyalty is prized more than ever: workers who are involuntarily unemployed
by downturn are the target of attempted ”poaching” by unmatched firms, since
they are likely to have been good workers to their incumbent firms, and re-
turning firms give up on their incumbent workers that allow themselves to be
poached. As a result, this selective   yet still somewhat random   rematching
does not result in more shirking.
6In experimental designs involving relational contracts and prosociality, there are always
high and low equilibria. Many experiments in other domains with multiple equilibria have
shown that exogenous random re-matching of agents can undermine e ciency. See Camerer,
2003 Chapter 7 on coordination games (Van Huyck et al. 1990, 1991, Anderson et al. 2001);
and partner-stranger di↵erences in prisoner’s dilemma and public goods experiments (An-
dreoni 1988, Croson, 1996, Palfrey and Prisbey, 1997).
7A similar e↵ect occurs in volunteering, in which stochastic interruptions provide an excuse
for volunteers to quit without shame (Linardi and McConnell, 2011).
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Other recent experiments have explored robustness of gift-exchange e -
ciency. Bartling et al (2018) studied the BFF setting with worker e↵ort that
is only stochastically related to employer value.8 They find that with stochas-
tic outcome, expectations matter. Sessions indeed arrive at self-fulfilled high-
and low-trust expectations depending on whether they were previously shown
previous sessions with a strong wage-e↵ort relation (high trust) or sessions with
weak wage-e↵ort relation (low trust). This suggests that firms’ ability to target
(or disconnect) from workers that they have high (or low) expectation of was
crucial in overcoming the di culties introduced by the stochastic interruptions.
Bernard, Fanning and Yuksel (2018) find that allowing free sorting / matching
employers with fair-minded workers is indeed key. They observe lower e ciency
in their gift-exchange experiment when they introduce fixed-partner and pay cut
restrictions. Their results are consistent with a model of heterogeneous selfish
and reciprocal workers, much like ours in the general outline and dynamics.
An interesting real life example of the same robustness of relational contracts
to one side’s ability to fulfill implicit commitments to the others is Macchiavello
and Morjaria (2015)’s study of relational contracts for cut roses in Kenya. Lo-
cal Kenyan growers contract with foreign buyers. In the time period of their
data, ethnic violence which is localized and plausibly exogeneous (to activity
in the flower business) disrupts the regular supply chain of flowers. The vio-
lence imposes costs on di↵erent growers to fulfill implicit supply commitments.
The authors show that relational contracts emerge, and that those growers with
the newest and oldest buyer relationships do not ship roses during violence,
but growers with mid-length relationships do ship roses to maintain relational
stability. This again illustrates that underneath the robustness of relational
contracts is the remarkable adaptability of the contracting partners, who given
enough freedom, appear to reliably invent new strategies and norms that allow
business to proceed even in the most di cult environments.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we provide a theoreti-
cal model of the impact of stochastic interruptions on contracting, with testable
implications that are later tested by data from the experiments. Section III
describes the experimental design. Section IV discusses results. Section V is a
short conclusion.
2 Theoretical Model
In this gift exchange game let [w, e˜] denote the wage w 2 [0, 100] and desired
e↵ort level e˜ 2 [1, 10] in a contract o↵ered by an employer. A worker who
accepts the contract then chooses an actual e↵ort level e 2 [1, 10]. This e↵ort
costs the worker c(e).
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
8As a result, employers might make mistaken inferences about e↵ort from what the e↵ort
earns them.
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The monetary payo↵ of an employer is:
⇡(w, e) =
(
10e  w if the o↵er is accepted
0 otherwise
The monetary payo↵ to the worker is:
v(w, e) =
(
w   c(e) if the o↵er is accepted
5 otherwise
Let wˆ(e˜) = [10e˜+c(e˜)]/2 denote a fair wage o↵er    one that o↵ers an equal
(or better) split of surplus. For desired e↵ort e˜, the corresponding schedule of
fair wages is given below:
e˜ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
wˆ(e˜) 5 10.5 16 22 28 34 40 46 52.5 59
Let there be two types of workers, selfish workers and fair workers. A worker
is fair with probability p 2 (0, 1). Utility of a selfish worker is just his monetary
payo↵:
u(w, e) = v(w, e)
The utility of a fair worker o↵ered a contract of (w, e˜) and delivering e is:9
u(w, e) =
(
v(w, e) w < wˆ(e˜)
v(w, e)  bmax(e˜  e, 0) w   wˆ(e˜)
where disutility b of not fulfilling a fair contract is assumed to be high enough
such that a fair worker will always provide the requested e↵ort if he accepts a
fair contract.
Proposition 1 Consider a game of 1 period with excess demand of labor:
F   2 employers and W > F worker where p workers are fair. The following
is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: employers will o↵er wˆ(e˜) and fair workers
will perform e = e˜ while selfish workers perform e = 1 for the following p, e˜ pairs.
p < 0.55 e˜ = 1
0.55  p < 0.6 e˜ = 2
0.6  p < 0.65 3  e˜  8
p   0.65 8  e˜  10
Proof. Since there are no future periods, 1   p selfish workers would shirk no
matter what wage is o↵ered. Employers are restricted to fair wages wˆ(e˜) if they
want to get beyond minimum e↵ort from the p fair workers. Since there is an
9Roe and Wu (2004), replicating the BFF findings, correlated relational contracting with
individual social preferences measured independently. Their results justify the concept of
di↵erent ”homemade” worker preference types and show solid evidence linking such preferences
measured independently with behavior in the BFF environment.
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excess supply of labor, employers can choose the most profit maximizing wages
out of all possible wˆ(e˜). The employers’ problem is then to choose e˜ to maximize
max
e˜
⇡(e˜) = 10(pe˜+ (1  p)1)  w(e˜)
Taking a derivative over e˜ and setting it to 0 after substituting the definition of
w(e˜), we arrive at:
@⇡
@e˜
= 10p  5  c
0(e˜)
2
= 0
And hence an employer’s profit is maximized when c0(e˜) = 20p   10, which
implies employer should o↵er wˆ(e˜) with any e˜ that satisfy the condition above.
Solving this for the menu of e↵ort costs, we arrive at c0(e˜) = 1 when p = 0.55,
c0(e˜) = 2 when p = 0.60, and c0(e˜) = 3 when p   0.65.
Proposition 2 Consider a game of T period with excess supply of labor:
F   2 employers and W > F worker. When a worker accepts an employer’s
contract, both worker and employer cannot contract with anyone else in that
period. employers experience a publicly observable downturn where they cannot
hire for k = 1 period with probability     0. At any period t  T ,
• The probability that an employer will be in the market for the first time
at period t   1, Firstt is  t 1(1   ).
• The probability that an employer is able to extend an immediate contract
renewal to its incumbent worker at period t, Renewt, is (1   )2 for t   2,
0 otherwise.
• The probability that an employer is returning at period t from a downturn
to a market where he has an incumbent worker, Returnt, is (1  )(   t 1)
for t   1 + k = 2, 0 otherwise.
• Suppose employers prefer contracting with an incumbent worker but if
unable to do so, would randomly send an o↵er to any available worker
(workers whose incumbent employer is under downturn or has not con-
tracted yet). Then the probability that an available worker receive an
o↵er (from a non-incumbent employer) can be recursively determined by:
rt =
(Returntrt 1 + Firstt)F
W   (Renewt  Returnt(1  rt 1))F (1)
which for t   1 + k = 2 simplifies to the following
rt =
(1   )( t 1 + (     t 1)rt 1)F
W   (1   )(1    + (     t 1)(1  rt 1))F (2)
Proof. • The probability that an employer enter the market for the first
time at period t is the probability of experiencing t  1 downturns ( t 1)
and getting out at period t. Therefore Firstt =  t 1(1   ).
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• The probability that an employer can contract at any period is (1    ).
Hence the probability of a continuous 2-period contract is (1   )2 .
• The probability that an employer enter the market at period t as a return-
ing employer is the probability that an employer that is in a downturn
enters the market  (1   ) minus the probability that this is its first time
Firstt. Therefore Returnt = (1   )    Firstt = (1   )(     t 1)
• First consider the number of employers that will make o↵ers to non-
incumbent workers. FirsttF employers will make such o↵ers since they
have not yet contracted with any workers. In addition, the ReturntF
employers will be reentering the market at period t. The probability that
their worker has switched employer in their absence is rt 1, resulting in
Returntrt 1F unmatched employers.
• Now consider the number of workers that will be targeted for these of-
fers. Employers will avoid the RenewtF workers that have an incum-
bent employer from period t   1 since these pairs will reconnect un-
less the workers shirk. Returnt(1   rt 1)F other workers will receive
reconnection o↵ers from a returning incumbent employer. This leaves
W   (Renewt  Returnt(1  rt 1))F workers available for contracting.
• The chance that any available worker will receive an o↵er is therefore as
in Eq. 1. Substituting and simplifying we arrive at Eq. 2.
Proposition 3 Consider a game of T period with excess demand of labor:
F   2 employers and W > F worker where p = 0.55 workers are fair. There
may be exogenous interruption in hiring: with probability     0, employers
experience a downturn and cannot hire for k = 1 period. We assume that
when faced with two identical o↵ers, a worker prefer his incumbent employer:
i.e the employer that has just contracted with him. Similarly, when faced with
two ex-ante identical workers (e.g. no history of shirking), an employer prefers
her incumbent worker. The following strategies and beliefs constitute a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium in which both worker types perform requested e↵ort in
all non-final periods.
• employers not under downturn o↵er the contract wˆ(e˜) = 11 for e˜ = 2 at
period T. Fair workers perform e = 2 while selfish workers shirk (perform
e = 1).
• Let Vt(¬shirk) (or Vt(shirk)) be the cumulative future payo↵ of not shirk-
ing (or shirking) at t. At period t < T , employers o↵er their incumbent
workers wˆ(e˜t) that satisfy the condition below if the worker has neither
shirked nor contracted with other employer at t  1.
c(e˜t)  Vt(¬shirk)  Vt(shirk)
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If their incumbent worker has shirked or is no longer available, the em-
ployer o↵ers the same contract to available workers (workers with no active
incumbent employer). If there are no available workers left, employers o↵er
(5, 1) to any workers.
• At period t < T , workers accept o↵ers from incumbent employers and
perform requested e↵ort. When a worker’s incumbent employer is hit by
a downturn, and if the worker receives an identical o↵er from another
employer (which happens with probability rt), then the worker switches
employer.
• At period t = 1, (1   )F employers make public o↵ers of wˆ(10). Workers
unmatched at t = 1 becomes employed at period t with probability rt.
• O↵-equilibrium beliefs: Employers assume all workers that shirk are selfish
types. employers also assume that all workers that have just contracted
with other employers are unavailable to them (since workers prefer their
incumbent employer); a worker that accept a non-incumbent employer’s
o↵er when his incumbent employer is not under downturn is assumed to
have shirked against his incumbent employer. If there are no e˜t that satisfy
the condition such that selfish types do not shirk, employers behave as if
they are in a one period game.
Proof. • Step 0: period t = T . See Proposition 1
• Step 1: (behavior of fair workers at t < T )
Fair workers will provide the requested e↵ort regardless of whether the
hiring employer is an incumbent employer or a new employer since in
equilibrium all employers will only o↵er fair wages.
• Step 2: (behavior of selfish workers at t = T   1)
At period T   1 selfish workers who receive an o↵er of wˆ( ˜eT 1) decides
whether or not to shirk. From Proposition 2, the probability that a worker
receive an o↵er from an employer that is not its incumbent employer is rt.
A worker that does not shirk will need to bear the cost of e↵ort this period
but will receive wˆ(e˜T ) at the last period if his incumbent employer are able
to hire, which occur with probability 1  . If his incumbent employer is in
a downturn, with probability rT the worker may still get an o↵er of wˆ(e˜T )
from an employer that has not contracted with him before. This leaves
 (1   rT ) as the probability that a worker that does not shirk in period
T   1 is left without an o↵er in period T , earning only the unemployment
pay of 5.
uT 1(¬shirk) = wˆ( ˜eT 1) c( ˜eT 1)+(1  )wˆ(e˜T )+ (rT wˆ(e˜T )+(1 rT )5)
If the selfish worker shirk at T   1, he will not receive an o↵er from his
incumbent employer at T . But if his incumbent employer happens to go
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on a downturn, this covers up his shirking and he may still receive an o↵er
from another employer with probability rT .
uT 1(shirk) = wˆ( ˜eT 1) +  rT wˆ(e˜T ) + (1   rT )5
Subtracting uT 1(shirk) from uT 1(¬shirk), we find that to get non-
minimal e↵ort from selfish workers at period T  1, an o↵er has to satisfy:
c( ˜eT 1)  (1   )(wˆ(e˜T )  5)
• Step 3: (behavior of selfish workers at t < T )
Generalizing to any t < T , equilibrium o↵er that keeps selfish types from
shirking wˆ(e˜⇤t ) must satisfy:
c(e˜t)  Vt(¬shirk)  Vt(shirk) (3)
If no c(e˜t) satisfy Eq 3, the employer’s best choice is to treat the game as
a series of one-shot games.
To compute Vt(¬shirk), note that a worker that does not shirk will get an
o↵er at t + 1 if the employer is not a↵ected by the downturn. If the em-
ployer is a↵ected (with probability   ), the worker switch employers with
probability rt or remain unemployed but still connected to the incumbent
employer with probability 1  rt.
Vt(¬shirk) =(1   )ut+1(o↵er) +  (rt+1ut+1(o↵er)
+ (1  rt+1)(5 + Vt+1(¬shirk))) (4)
Because there is no shirking in equilibrium until t = T , the payo↵ to the
selfish type of getting an o↵er is:
ut(o↵er) =
(
wˆ(e˜T ) if t = T
wˆ(e˜T )  c((e˜T ) + Vt(¬shirk) otherwise
Similarly, the future payo↵ of shirking at period t is:
Vt(shirk) = rt+1ut+1(o↵er)
(1   rt+1)ut+1(¬o↵er) (5)
where,
ut(¬o↵er) =
(
5 if t = T
5 + rt+1ut+1(o↵er) + (1  rt+1)ut+1(¬o↵er) otherwise
The four sub-figures in Figure 1 below provide simulation results illustrating
the dynamics of new employment opportunities (rt, left panel) and equilibrium
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e↵ort level (e⇤t , right panel) in time. The top panel illustrates the e↵ect of one-
period interruptions (k = 1) while the bottom panel illustrates interruptions
that last for three periods (k = 3). We use 9 employers and 10 workers in this
simulation. Together, the propositions and the simulation results allow us to
predict the e↵ect of stochastic interruptions on bilateral contracts and derive
some testable implications for a human subjects experiment.
Figure 1 about here.
Testable Implications
Below we present six testable implications from the theory. We include
simulation results for rt and equilibrium e↵ort level e⇤t for various   and k
below.
1. Decline in new o↵ers: The probability of getting an o↵er from a new
employer, rt, is decreasing in time t (Fig 1 Left panel). Intuitively, this is
first driven by the drop in the number of employers that are contracting
for the first time. But as rt decreases, the number of unmatched returning
employers in the next period decrease as well, reducing the number of o↵ers
in the market, which further decreases rt. We will run the regression:
NewO↵ertj = a+ b1Periodtj + b2 j + ✏tj (6)
where NewO↵ertj is the number of new o↵ers in period t 2 {1, ..30} of
session j. From Proposition 2, we hypothesize that b1 < 0.
2. Downturn probability slows down decline in new o↵ers: As the probability
of interruption   increases, the window of opportunity for workers to start
a new relationship with a non-incumbent employer extends further into
the game. For example, in our simulation in the top left panel of Fig 1
(k = 1), we find that rt > 0 for only the first period when   = 0, for the
first six periods when   = 0.1, and for the first ten periods for   = 0.5.
We will test this with the regression:
NewO↵ertj = a+ b1Periodtj + b2 j + b3Period x  tj + ✏tj (7)
where Period x  tj is an interaction term. From Proposition 2 we hypoth-
esize that b3 > 0.
3. Downturn probability increases the number of partners needed for the same
level of market activity. Due to rt, instability in relationships (e.g. number
of trading partners) increases with  , especially in the early periods.
Uniqueemployersij = a+b1 j+b2NumContractsij+b3NumContracts x  ij
(8)
10
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where Uniqueemployersij is the number of unique employers that worker i
contracted with in session j and NumContractsij is the number of period
where the worker was employed for. From Proposition 2 we hypothesize
that b3 > 0 and that the magnitude of b3 in the early periods is larger
than what it is in the later periods.
4. Employers use downturns to poach other employers’ workers: employers
distinguish between available and unavailable workers. Workers get more
o↵ers from new employers when incumbent employers are in a downturn.
We will run the regression:
NewO↵erijt = a+ b1Xjt + b2employerDturnijt (9)
where NewO↵erijt is the number of new o↵ers worker i gets in period t.
Xjt are the control variables Period,  , and Numemployers (number of
employers that in the market at period t). employerDturnijt is a binary
variable indicating if worker i’s incumbent employer is under downturn.
Our hypothesis is that b2 > 0.
Prop 3 also suggests that one consequence of this ”poaching” will be that
employers returning from a downturn will be less likely to attempt to
reconnect with incumbent workers that worked for other employers during
the downturn period. We will test this as well.
ReconnectionO↵erijt = a+ b1Xjt + b2ContractedWOthersijt (10)
5. Shirking is not increased by downturns: Even though relationships take
longer to form, there are not more shirking due to   because in equilibrium
there is no shirking in all of them.
eijt   e˜ijt = a+ b1Periodtj + b2 j + b3Last5Pertj + b4Last5Per x j (11)
where eijt e˜ijt is the degree of shirking worker i engaged in in his contract
at period t and Last5Pertj is a binary variable that is 1 if period t > 25,
the period where unraveling is predicted to start from the simulation of
k = 3. Note that we expect lower e↵ort but no shirking but since the
employers in equilibrium are aware of the earlier unravelling with greater
  and adjust their requested e↵ort accordingly. From Proposition 3 we
hypothesize that b2 = 0 and b4 = 0.
6. E ciency is not decreased by downturns (except in the last few periods):
Though the market unravels earlier with an increase in  , market e ciency
is generally unharmed because shirking does not become more prevalent.
Because market e ciency is the surplus generated by a trade compared
to the maximum possible surplus,10 e↵ort in itself is a su cient proxy for
e ciency.
eitj == a+ b1Periodtj + b2 j + b3Last5Pertj + b4Last5Per x j (12)
10Market e ciency is [10e  c(e)]/[10emax   c(emax)] where emax = 10
11
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where eijt is the e↵ort level delivered by worker i in period t in session j.
From Prop 3 and Fig 1 right panel we hypothesize that b2 = 0 but b4 < 0.
3 Experimental Design
We implemented the following three conditions to test the robustness of rela-
tional contracts to exogenous stochastic interruptions. All session consists of
9 employers and 10 workers,11 who traded for 30 periods. We utilize a large
number of employers, workers, and periods in order to have enough employers
to contract during periods of stochastic interruptions.
Our baseline treatment, a labor market without interruptions (  = 0), is a
replication of BFF1‘s incomplete contract condition with reputation formation.
This is a finitely repeated game where employers and workers are assigned a
fixed ID that will persist for the entire game. Employers make contract o↵ers,
specifying wages (w) and desired e↵ort level (e˜). An employer can o↵er the
same contracts to all workers at once using a publicly posted o↵er, observable
to everyone in the market (including employers). An employer can also address
its o↵er to a specific worker using private contracts sent to the worker’s ID.12
An employer can make as many o↵ers as it desires, but can only contract
with one worker in each period. Workers cannot make o↵ers, instead they can
only choose from a listing of all public o↵ers and the private o↵ers addressed to
them. A worker can only accept one contract per period.13 After accepting a
contract, the worker chooses the e↵ort level he wants to deliver (e). Since third
party enforcement is absent, the worker does not have to abide by the e↵ort level
requested by the employer. The cost of e↵ort and payo↵s for both employers
and workers, which follows the theoretical model in the previous section, are
then displayed to both parties.14
We implement two levels of stochastic interruptions,   = 0.10 and   = 0.50.
Here there is commonly known probability ( ) of an employer-specific shock,
which prevents contracting for several periods. As explained in the introduc-
tion, this treatment modeled idiosyncratic employer-specific shocks that exoge-
nously interrupt relationships and provide other employers with an opportunity
to contract with temporarily “laid-o↵” workers. An employer that is experi-
encing this interruption cannot make any o↵ers, and therefore cannot hire any
workers. However, this employer is able to observe the market and is therefore
aware of other employers’ public o↵ers and of all workers’ employment status.
To eliminate the employer’s misrepresentation of its ability to hire, the identities
of the employers who are experiencing a shock in the current round are public
knowledge to all employers and workers.
11Except for one   = 0.5 session where we had 18 subjects and hence ran with 9 employers
and 9 workers. While there is little power to test whether this session produced di↵erent
results than the other four, there are no substantive di↵erences so all sessions were pooled in
our analyses.
12A screenshot of the employer’s contracting screen can be seen in Fig A1 in the Appendix.
13The worker’s screen can be seen in Fig A2 in the Appendix.
14The outcome screen can be seen in Fig A3 in the Appendix.
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We chose to implement a three-period interruption (k = 3). This duration
is short enough to have a small e↵ect on payo↵s, but long enough that a laid-
o↵ worker and his new employer    if she finds one    may develop a new
relationship. For analytical tractability, we have modeled only the k = 1 case
in the theoretical section. Briefly, the k = 3 case proceeds similarly: at t = 1,
 F employers will experience downturn and hence are prevented from making
their first o↵ers until period t = 1 + k. (1    )F employers make their initial
matches. At t = 2, (1  ) F of these matched employers are unable to contract,
and at t = 3, another (1   )2 F employers also experience downturn. Then at
t = 4 the  F employers that were knocked out of the market in the first period
k = 3 will make initial o↵ers in the market. They could be matched with any
of the W   F (1   ) workers that have never contracted, or the workers whose
incumbent employers are under downturn. If they matched with workers whose
employers are under downturn, these workers will stay with these  F employers
as their new incumbent. Therefore at period t = 5 there will potentially be
(1    )( )F returning employers that are now unmatched, and hence are now
looking for new workers. Even though our model shows one equilibrium where
these interruptions need not a↵ect market equilibrium, one can see how these
interruptions could have a similar e↵ect to random rematching, which has been
shown to adversely a↵ect e ciency in a di↵erent type of coordination game (Van
Huyck et al , 1990).
Because the interruption “knocks out” employers for several periods, as in
lifelike labor market shocks, the average demand for labor at a given period
will be lower as   increases. Demand for labor can be measured by the ratio of
employers to workers (a low ratio indicates less demand by employers). The ratio
of employers to workers across all periods (after accounting for the interruptions)
is 0.45 for   = 0.50, 0.81 for   = 0.10, and 0.90 for   = 0 is 0.76. To partially
account for the e↵ect of lower demand for labor, we calculate the number of
employers that are active at every period (NumEmployerstj in Eq.8) and ran
the regressions with and without them, finding no substantive changes in our
conclusions.15
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software,
based on the BFF1 original software. Figure A.1-3 in the Appendix provides a
graphical timeline of the experiment using screenshots. Before the game started,
subjects were given a quiz to ensure their understanding of the game and the
payo↵s to employer and seller. Each session lasted approximately 100 minutes
and subjects earned, on average, $35. We conducted 5 sessions of each treat-
ment at the University of Pittsburgh. In the Appendix we include data from
pilot experiments at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) where sub-
jects have substantial laboratory experience, and at University of California in
Los Angeles (UCLA) which is representative of a more typical large-university
student population. The Caltech sessions provide a comparison of   = 0 and
  = 0.05, while the UCLA sessions include   = 0 and   = 0.1
15Brown, Falk and Fehr (2012) found that relational contract persist under di↵erent firm
worker ratio, even when there is excess demand for labor rather than excess supply of labor.
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4 Results
Our results section is organized as follows: Tables 1-2 show summary statistics.
Table 1 reports statistics at the session level (with each session average con-
tributing one data point). Table 2 reports reports statistics at the worker level
(with each worker contributing one data point). Figure 2 provide the empirical
version of rt, private o↵ers from new employers, and et, e↵ort level, that were
simulated in Figure 1 (bottom panel, k = 3). Table 3-6 present regressions
testing the six testable implications from the theoretical model, which is then
summarized in Table 7.
Table 1 shows that employers o↵er wages averaging 35-40 and request e↵ort
a bit above 7 in all treatments. Workers deliver a little more than 6 units of
e↵ort, shirking by a little more than 1 e↵ort unit. Because e↵ort is below the
surplus-maximizing value of 10, market e ciency is around 60%. These results
so far are not statistically di↵erent across the three values of   (at p < .10
two-tailed).
Table 1 here.
Figure 2 depicts two main time trends across the 30 periods in the sessions.
There are a lot of private o↵ers from new employers in the first ten period (about
.2/worker), dwindling to .05 in later periods except when   = 0.5.16 Delivered
e↵ort drifts up over time to a surprisingly similar degree across all   conditions,
starting around 5 units and increasing to 7 (except for a sharp downturn in the
end).
Figure 2 here.
However, there are some indication of di↵erences in the underlying relation-
ship dynamics. As a starting point we will follow other studies in this framework
in examining the di↵erence between private and public o↵ers. Recall that pri-
vate o↵ers are made to a specific number-identified worker; public o↵ers can be
accepted by any worker. Other studies as well as ours find that private o↵ers
pay a higher wage and delivered e↵orts tend to increase over time for private
o↵ers (as they become ongoing relational contracts) but decline over time for
public o↵ers (see Figure A5-A8).17
The bottom half of Table 1 shows that private o↵ers, which make up about
30-36% of all contracts, pay significantly less in   = 0.5, suggesting some di -
culties in long term contracting. Shirking in private contracts is slightly larger
16Note the similar pattern of spikes in this overture to new relationships as predicted by
the simulation in bottom left panel of Fig 1.
17Note, however, that we made no directed hypothesis about public o↵ers since our theo-
retical model predicts that it will be used only at t = 1.
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in   = 0.5 though not significantly so, but decreased shirking in public contracts
makes up for it: delivered e↵ort went from being 2.7 units less than requested
e↵ort when   = 0 to only 1.9 units less when   = 0.5.18 This results in workers
giving up more of the surplus to employers as we go from   = 0 to   = 0.5 (70%
to 63%).
Table 2 shows worker-level statistics. There is a gradation of accepting
o↵ers from new employers in the first half of the sessions, which is most active
for   = 0 (4.28 employers) and least for   = .5 (2.86). In the second half this
di↵erence reverses, as workers tend to stick with incumbent employers (only .22
new employers) when   = 0 but find new employers .96 times when   = .5.
This suggests a delay in forming long-term relationships when there are more
downturns.
Table 2 here.
The types of o↵ers accepted by these workers are similar across treatments,
except that there are much fewer immediate renewals– that is, employers o↵ering
a private contract to the same worker as in the previous period– when there are
downturns (37% with   = 0.10 and 9% with   = 0.50), compared to 53.2%
when there are no downturns. However, the lack of continuity does not lead to
more shirking: outside of the last 5 periods, the gap between delivered e↵ort
and requested e↵ort are not larger as   increases.
We now move to the regression analysis that tests the six empirical impli-
cations of the theory developed above. First, Table 3 indicates the time trends
in the opportunities for new contracting relationships. The coe cients of Pe-
riod across Model 1-4 indicate that both private o↵ers from new employers and
public o↵ers becomes less frequent over time. Our model predicts that because
downturn extend the supply of unmatched employers, the decline in new o↵ers
across periods will not as strong for higher  . However, Model 2 and 4 shows
a positive but insignificant coe cient on Period x  , suggesting that higher  
did not significantly extend the window of time where there are opportunities
of new employers.
Table 3 here.
In Table 4 the total number of unique employers a worker has contracted
with is regressed against the total number of contracts he received in the session.
Interestingly, in Model 1 the number of contracts is not generally correlated with
the number of employers a worker has had, and  , which knocks out employers
from the market, does not significantly decrease contracting partners. Model
2 explains why. The coe cient on Number of contracts show that in market
18The improved public market can be see in Fig A7 in the Appendix.
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with no interruptions, more contracts are associated with fewer employers since
they arise from stable long term relationships. But as interruptions increases,
long term relationships are harder to obtain and a worker need to explore more
employers Num contracts x   to maintain the same level of labor market activity.
This instability is largely confined to the first half of the session (t < 16), as
indicated by comparing Num contracts x   term in Model 3 and 4.
Table 4 here.
Table 5 shows that employers are discerning of who they contract with.
Model 1 shows that whether employers at t renew contracts with the workers
they had at t  1 at is strongly predicted by e  e˜. The employer is 11% more
likely to attempt an immediate renewal for every point of bonus e↵ort: e↵ort
delivered by the worker beyond the employer’s request. Shirkers, for whom
e  e˜ < 0, will then be more likely to be seek new employers to contract with.
How then, should an unmatched employer find a good worker and avoid
shirkers? Model 2 shows that the number of private o↵ers from new employers
goes up by 0.033 when a worker’s previous employer has just entered a downturn.
Given that each worker receives on average only 0.104 private overtures from new
employers each period, this is a substantial increase. It appears that employers
notice suddenly-unemployed workers and try to ”poach” them with new o↵ers.
How would the incumbent employer react to this poaching? Our model
describe an equilibrium where all agents prefer to continue contracting with
whoever they contracted with last, supported by o↵-equilibrium beliefs that
workers that do not do so have shirked. This implies that employers returning
from downturn are reluctant to reconnect with workers that worked for other
employers, since they now have new employers. This reluctance to reconnect
is expressed by the negative coe cient on the variable Workers contracted w/
others in Column (3).
Table 5 here.
Finally, Table 6 investigates the dynamics of shirking, defined as a negative
di↵erence between delivered e↵ort and actual e↵ort and delivered e↵ort. (De-
livered e↵ort e is highly correlated with surplus e ciency, which is 10e  c(e).)
Model 1 shows that in the beginning, workers deliver e↵ort that is -2.26 units
less than what is requested. Workers shirk less in later periods (Period), except
for an expected endgame drop in the last period (Last period). Contrary to
what is often seen with random rematching but in line with our model, shirking
does not increase with  . This is true even at the last period LastPer x  j or the
last 5 periods LastPer x  j . E↵ort, however, is significantly lower at the last
5 periods. Note, however, that the coe cient for Model 3 and 4 are essentially
the same. Our intuition is that contrary to what our model predicted, there is
16
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indeed more shirking at the last 5 periods due to  , but we are underpowered
to estimate that e↵ect precisely. We suspect that employers are not completely
aware of how early the high equilibrium would unravel due to   and may not
have adjusted requested e↵ort fast enough.
Table 6 here.
Table 7 plucks out and organizes coe cients from Tables 3-6 which test the
six theoretical predictions from section 2. These predictions generally go in
the right direction, but we appear under-powered to detect (or reject) some of
them. For example, the regression didn’t find that downturn significantly slows
down the decline of private o↵ers from new employees (Row 1) though there
is a positive estimated e↵ect and the graph of private contracts illustrates it.
Similarly, we believe that the the insignificant coe cient on shirking at the last
few periods (b4 on the 5th row) would probably be significant with larger sample.
Overall, a model in which employers and workers may responds to stochastic
interruptions by randomly    but selectively    re-matching does a fair job
capturing many of the dynamics about the types of o↵ers, the exploration of
new employer partners, and actual e↵orts that are seen in the data.
Table 7 here.
5 Conclusion
These experiments explore robustness of gift-exchange markets to a lifelike type
of interruption. In these experimental markets employers o↵er a promised (en-
forceable wage) and request e↵ort from workers. E↵ort is costly for workers and
valuable for employers; surplus is created if workers accept jobs and choose high
e↵ort. Surplus creation is strictly increasing in worker e↵ort.
Previous experiments have shown that e ciency can be quite high, especially
when workers are identified and employers can repeatedly contract by making
a private worker-specific o↵er. These are relational contracts because while the
employers can request e↵ort, there is moral hazard on the worker side because
there is no explicit contractible short-run penalty if a worker chooses low e↵ort
(in order to reduce e↵ort costs).
The key experimental treatment is a change in the probability with which
employers su↵er a three-period “downturn” and cannot hire workers. Many
disruptions are possible in these markets. The short-run shocks to labor demand
are just a starting point for an experimental program of understanding how
robust these markets are to other kinds of business-cycle like changes.
As has been seen in earlier experiments, in the typical healthy market for
relational contracts an employer first hire a worker, then renew contracts pri-
vately if the worker does not shirk. Downturns pose a challenge to this e cient
17
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regime of relational contracting by exogeneously breaking such contracts. In
this paper we present a theory in which firms challenged by this downturn navi-
gate through selfish, strategic workers, who co-exist with fair-minded ones (who
always provide requested e↵ort), and manage to maintain the high equilibrium.
This model has several testable implications. General patterns in the data are
consistent with these predictions. Selective re-matching from the employer man-
age to right the ship and keep workers from shirking, creating an overlapping
series of new relational contracts even when the downturn rate is as high as
  = .5.
We conclude with two remarks. First, the statistical power to identify di↵er-
ences across   conditions is limited. As is well-known in experimental economics,
the error structure in observations from individuals and periods in complicated
markets are complicated to analyze (e.g. Frechette 2011). A conservative way to
treat these data is that one experimental session is a single observation (see Ta-
ble 1). Nonetheless, the main observations in these 15 sessions were also evident
in a large number of sessions in two previous student subject pools:19 stochas-
tic interruptions do not harm high equilibrium (Appendix Table A1), terminate
the relationship of less optimal employer-worker pairs (Appendix Table A2),
and improve the short term market (Appendix Fig A5-8).
Second, it is always the case that these markets have equilibria in which
employers expect all workers to completely shirk, so employers o↵er the low-
est profitable wage, workers do shirk, and no relational contracts form. In
this paper we present a theoretical model predicting minimal harm to market
equilibrium. However, our intuition in beginning this research was that it is
also quite possible that exogenous downturns could inject enough strategic un-
certainty to undermine formation of relational contracts and market e ciency,
tilting the markets toward the low wage-e↵ort equilibrium. The mere chance
of downturn implemented by   could act as a correlating device that influences
collective beliefs about e↵ort reciprocity in response to wages (much as examples
of previous market behavior influenced apparent beliefs in Bartling et al 2018).
Such pessimistic beliefs could be self-fulfilling. However, even with high rates
of expected downturns these markets achieve substantial e ciency. E ciencies
were 62-67% across all values of   (excluding the typical drop from endgame
anticipation in the last 5 periods). The main thing we learned is that these
markets are surprisingly resilient to exogenous interruptions.
Finally, during the extreme condition with   = .5, employers were often in
downturns, creating involuntary unemployment among workers. As a result, a
large number of subjects– both employers and workers– in those experimental
sessions were visibly bored and not very happy. It has been known for a long
time that unemployment is bad for mental health (Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld,
1938; Paul and Moser, 2009) and causes a host of other negative social outcomes.
Unemployment strongly reduces measured subjective well-being (DiTella, Mac-
Culloch and Oswald, 2001; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006) and negative e↵ects
can be long-lasting (Lucas et al (2004). Observing these miserable subjects sug-
19These data are treated as pilots and reported only in an Appendix.
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gests that the labor market experimental paradigm could conceivably be used to
study the psychology and even consequences such e↵ects. Similarly, successful
relational contracting between pairs of people may generate a sense of social
closeness, camaraderie, endogeneous group a liation or empathy (what Adam
Smith called fellow-feeling). Experimental observation of these psychological
and emotional forces could be done combining the usual observations of choice
and e↵ort with self-reports and biological measures. Such measures, combined
with theory, could bring more scientific precision to concepts that are often rele-
gated to areas of public health or organizational psychology and are important,
but not present in most economic contracting models (cf. Brandts, Cooper and
Weber, 2015 on legitimacy).
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Fig 1: Simulation results of rt (Prop 2) and ~e*t (Prop 3) for k=1,3 and 0≤δ≤0.7 
 
Right: the probability that a worker receives a private offer from a new employer remains positive longer as 
interruption probability increases (0≤δ≤0.7). Top right: new private offer probabilities when interruptions last one 
period (k=1). Bottom right: three period interruptions (k=3) further extends the relationship formation period. The 
pattern of spikes at period t=1,4,7,..  is due to the start of the first set of interruptions at t=1.  
Left:  the high equilibrium starts unravelling earlier as interruption probability increases. Top left: equilibrium 
effort levels in the last 5 periods with one-period interruptions (k=1). Bottom left: early unravelling becomes more 
pronounced with the three period interruptions (k=3)  
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Fig 2:  Experimental Results: new private offers and effort across periods.  
Top: The average number of private offers from new employers (i.e., employers who had not previously hired the 
same workers) per worker at each of 30 periods for each experimental treatment. This number goes down over 
time, but decreases more slowly for higher values of the downturn probability δ. Bottom: The average level of 
delivered effort on contracts at each period. There is an upward drift and a one-period endgame drop in period 30. 
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Table 1: Session level summary statistics (Each session contributes one data point.)  
Probability of employer downturn δ=0 δ=0.1 δ=0.5 
Number of experimental sessions N=5 N=5 N=5 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Contracts:          
Offered wages from employer 38.99 1.96 39.41 2.59 34.42 3.72 
Requested effort 7.14 0.29 7.61 0.35 7.28 0.57 
Delivered effort from workers 6.21 0.24 6.64 0.4 6.25 0.64 
           
Market efficiency:          
At the last period 0.61 0.03 0.37** 0.08 0.41* 0.1 
During last 5 periods 0.71 0.03 0.73 0.03 0.63 0.06 
Before last 5 periods 0.62 0.03 0.67 0.04 0.65 0.06 
           
% of contracts from private offers  63% 0.05 71% 0.03 68% 0.09 
Private offers wages 46.82 0.81 45.33 2.44 37.38*** 3.09 
Delivered-requested effort: -0.76 0.11 -0.67 0.08 -0.89 0.28 
Public offers wages 24.25 3.87 24.92 1.67 25.49 4.18 
Delivered-requested effort: -2.73 0.21 -2.78 0.18 -1.91* 0.4 
Worker's share of surplus 0.72 0.03 0.67 0.06 0.63* 0.03 
Wilcoxon test of treatment differences from δ=0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p≤0.1 
Table 2: Worker level summary statistics 
Probability of employer downturn δ=0 δ=0.1 δ=0.5 
Number of workers N=50 N=50 N=49 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Number of contracts 26.46 0.55 20.5*** 0.81 10.7*** 0.87 
             
Number of new employers: 4.54 0.23 4.60 0.20 3.86** 0.23 
During the 1st half 4.28 0.22 4.00 0.17 2.86*** 0.23 
During the 2nd half 0.22 0.07 0.54*** 0.1 0.96*** 0.15 
             
Contracts from:            
Private offer from new employers 0.086 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.01 
Public offers 0.382 0.04 0.33 0.04 0.37 0.04 
Immediate renewal offers 0.532 0.04 0.37*** 0.04 0.09*** 0.01 
Reconnection offers 0 0.00 0.03*** 0.01 0.084*** 0.01 
             
Delivered-requested effort:            
Before last 5 periods -1.67 0.20 -1.47 0.18 -1.64 0.28 
During last 5 periods -1.33 0.28 -1.85 0.28 -2.34** 0.44 
T-test of treatment differences from δ=0. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3: Opportunities to start contracting with new employers are reduced over time, and an increase in 
downturn probability does not significantly change this trend.  
  
# of private offers 
from new employers  # of public offers  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Period (per 10) -0.057*** -0.076*** -0.025* -0.046** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021) 
δ (per 0.1) 0.012 -0.003 -0.036*** -0.053*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.008) 
Period x δ 
 
0.009 
 
0.011 
 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 0.013*** 0.012*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 0.093* 0.125** 1.003*** 1.041*** 
 (0.050) (0.060) (0.055) (0.049) 
 
    
Observations 4,470 4,470 4,470 4,470 
R-squared 0.038 0.042 0.064 0.068 
Bootstrapped standard errors (50 replications) in parentheses clustered at the session level (15 sessions). 
Note: Data from 30 periods of observation from 149 workers (and 135 employers). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We rescaled the period indicator to be in units of 10 periods and the probability of downturn to be in units of 0.1 
for the regressions.  
 
Table 4: Workers interact with more employers per contracts as downturn probability increases. This instability is 
more pronounced in the first half (3) than the second (4). 
  Number of unique employers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES All periods All periods 1st half 2nd half 
          
Number of contracts (per 10) -0.000 -0.836*** -0.579 -0.434*** 
  (0.038) (0.265) (0.592) (0.156) 
δ (per 0.1) -0.152 -0.773*** -0.760*** 0.003 
  (0.152) (0.158) (0.142) (0.062) 
Num contract x δ  0.376*** 0.806*** 0.135* 
   (0.122) (0.228) (0.070) 
Constant 4.643*** 6.559*** 4.859*** 0.817*** 
  (0.979) (0.784) (0.586) (0.175) 
      
Observations 149 149 149 149 
R-squared 0.044 0.152 0.326 0.151 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses clustered at the session level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: In model (4), we reset total contracts so far to the second half by subtracting the number of contracts the 
worker has by period 15.    
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Table 5: Employers are discerning about the workers they contract with: (1) employers renew contract with 
workers that provide the requested effort level or above, (2) employers looking for new employees target workers 
whose employer is unable to hire to do a downturn, and (3) employers returning from a downturn are less likely to 
try to reconnect with their incumbent workers if the worker has contracted with other employers during the 
downturn period.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Employer renew  
contract 
immediately 
# of private offers 
 from new employers 
Employer try to  
reconnect after  
downturn 
Delivered-requested effort 0.109***   
 (0.008)   
Worker’s employer is in downturn  0.033***  
  (0.007)  
Worker “poached” during   -0.054** 
Incumbent employer’s downturn.   (0.021) 
Period (per 10) 0.126*** -0.063*** 0.108*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) 
δ (per 0.1) -0.035** 0.007 -0.012 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.013) 
Number of employers able to  -0.000 0.012*** 0.002 
hire this period (0.005) (0.003) (0.013) 
Constant 0.580*** 0.104** 0.179 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.125) 
Observations 2,426 3,834 674 
R-squared 0.319 0.044 0.045 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses clustered at the session level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6: Changes in shirking (when delivered– requested effort<0) and effort over periods and its sensitivity to δ. 
  Delivered-requested effort Delivered effort 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Period (per 10) 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.076*** 0.127*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) 
δ (per 0.1) 0.037 0.046 0.080 0.006 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.071) (0.166) 
Last period -2.607*** -2.247***   
 (0.593) (0.678)   
Last period x δ  -0.260   
  (0.202)   
Last 5 periods    -0.943*** -1.078*** 
   (0.221) (0.207) 
Last 5 periods x δ   -0.194 -0.196** 
   (0.119) (0.099) 
Constant -0.014 -0.014 -0.010 -0.042 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.044) 
Observations 2,872 2,872 2,872 2,872 
R-squared 0.068 0.070 0.057 0.071 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses clustered at the session level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Note: Workers do not generally shirk more in response to higher interruption probability (i.e., the coefficient on δ 
is positive and insignificant by itself (1), when interacted with Last Period (2) and  when interacted with Last 5 
Period (3)).However, as predicted by theory the market does unravel earlier with higher δ: delivered effort in the 
last 5 periods fell an additional 0.196 points for every 10% interruption probability.  
Table 7: Summary of results of six testable implications  
  
Hypothesized effect 
Text 
eq’n 
Hypothesized 
coefficient 
Estimated coefficient 
(std. error) 
Source of 
coefficient  
Decline in new offers in time (6) b1<0   -.057(.008) T3, column (1) 
Downturn probability slows down decline 
in new offers 
(7) b3>0 .009 (.007) T3, column (2) 
Downturn probability increases the 
number of partners needed for the same 
level of market activity. 
(8) b3>0 
|b3(t<15)| > 
|b3(t>15)| 
.376 (.122) 
|.806 (.228) |> 
|.135(.070)| 
T4, column (2) 
T4, columns (3-4) 
Employers use downturns to poach other 
employers' workers. Incumbent employers 
do not reconnect with poached workers.   
(9) 
(10)  
b2>0  
b2<0  
.033 (.014) 
-.054 (.024) 
T5, column (2) 
T5, column (3) 
Shirking is not increased by downturns 
(even in the last few periods) 
(11) b2=0 
b4=0 
.080 (.071) 
-.194 (.119) 
T6, column (3) 
Delivered effort is not increased by 
downturn (except in the last few periods) 
(12) b2=0 
b4<0  
.006 (.166) 
-.196 (.099)  
T6, column (4) 
  
Note: T6 refers to Table 6, etc.  
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Employer’s contracting screen 
Employer submit private and public offer in this screen. At the top of the screen, employers can see their ID, the 
period number, and remaining time at this stage. At the two leftmost columns, employers can see the list of public 
offers in the market and the private offers the employer has sent out. At the bottom right of the screen the 
employers can see which employers has gone into downturn and the availability of all the workers in the market. 
(The former row of checkboxes is not present in the δ=0 treatment.) If a worker accepted an employer’s offer, the 
contract will be displayed under list of workers and the employer will not be able to make any other offers this 
period.  
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 Figure A2. Worker’s screen 
Here worker sees her own private offers and all the available public offers. At the top half of the screen the 
employer can see a row of checkboxes indicating which employer has gone into downturn.  (This feature is not 
present in the δ=0 treatment.)   Worker chooses which offer to accept. After accepting an offer, the worker 
proceeds to an effort screen where he enters an effort level (between 1 and 10). Effort cost increases in effort 
level.  
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Figure A3. Employer and worker’s earnings screen.  Both contracting partners can see each other’s payoff.  
 
 
Figure A4. Simulation of numerator (Top) and denominator (Bottom) of r_t (Prop 2) for k=3 
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Table A1: Summary statistics table for pilot sessions at other experimental sites 
Probability of employer downturn δ=0 δ=0.05 δ=0 δ=0.10 
Location Caltech Caltech UCLA UCLA 
Number of experimental sessions N=4 N=4 N=2 N=2 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Contracts:             
Offered wages from employer 43.23 3.05 45.06 2.54 37.01 0.16 35.20 3.55 
Requested effort 8.56 0.45 9.09 0.30 8.07 0.09 7.53 1.03 
Delivered effort from workers 8.10 0.23 8.11 0.24 6.45 0.14 6.14 0.22 
Worker's share of surplus 0.52 0.04 0.58 0.03 0.57 0.03 0.61 0.07 
                
% of contracts from private offers  0.79 0.03 0.82 0.04 0.78 0.07 0.72 0.04 
Private offers wages 48.18 3.03 48.09 2.88 42.59 3.55 38.68 2.96 
Delivered-requested effort: -0.28 0.30 -0.69 0.09 -1.03 0.25 -1.05 0.60 
Public offers wages 24.01 3.16 32.01 2.89 20.17 6.29 25.66 7.06 
Delivered-requested effort: -1.32 0.66 -2.11 0.36 -3.54 0.36 -2.16 1.18 
                
Market efficiency:               
At the last period 0.45 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.60 0.08 0.65 0.07 
During last 5 periods 0.80 0.03 0.69 0.08 0.71 0.07 0.72 0.03 
Before last 5 periods 0.82 0.03 0.85 0.01 0.65 0.00 0.62 0.04 
Note: market efficiency is generally unharmed by stochastic interruptions before the last five periods (e.g., 82% 
versus 85% in Caltech sample; 65% versus 62% in UCLA).  
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 Table A2 Characteristic of pre-interruption contract by post-interruption reconnection status.  
  Post interruption reconnection attempt 
  No attempt by 
employer 
Attempted by employer 
  Rejected by worker Accepted by worker 
Pre-interruption statistics Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. 
              
CALTECH δ=0.05  
(4 sessions)         
   
Offered Wage 38.75 4.79 47 N/A 50.2 3.08 
Offered Surplus 0.26 0.03 0.29 N/A 0.37 0.02 
Delivered Surplus 0.97 0.45 0.43 N/A 0.45 0.02 
Observations 12 1 20 
              
             
UCLA δ=0.1 (2 sessions)            
Offered Wage 27.32 3.56 23.5 6.65 44 6.89 
Offered Surplus 0.41 0.07 0.33 0.07 0.44 0.05 
Delivered Surplus 0.73 0.14 0.38 0.12 0.52 0.05 
Observations 19 4 12 
              
             
Pitt δ=0.1 (5 sessions)            
Offered Wage 22.09 1.81 21.25 10.08 49.39 2.12 
Offered Surplus 0.22 0.03 0.15 0.12 0.36 0.02 
Delivered Surplus 0.76 0.1 0.32 0.12 0.49 0.02 
Observations 32 4 49 
             
Pitt δ=0.5 (5 sessions)            
Offered Wage 27.95 1.66 28.77 6.3 39.69 1.41 
Offered Surplus 0.27 0.02 0.29 0.06 0.32 0.01 
Delivered Surplus 0.74 0.07 0.4 0.04 0.39 0.01 
Observations 106 13 113 
        
 
Note: Across the three different subject pools, we observe that employer-worker pairings that survive 
interruptions are generally very different than those that do not. Resilient employer-worker pairings feature more 
generous employers and workers that deliver fair effort.  The employers offer higher wages and more generous 
surplus sharing to workers. These offers are, however, still below the ideal 50-50 sharing but the workers remedy 
this by choosing effort level that brings surplus sharing close to equality.    
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Fig A5: Private and public effort at Caltech with δ=0 and δ=0.05 
 
Fig A6: Private and public effort at UCLA with δ=0 and δ=0.10 
 
Note: we also observe across our three different subject pools that whenever the private market perform a little 
worse due to the interruptions, workers start delivering high effort level in the public market, therefore 
maintaining the overall efficiency of the labor market.    
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Fig A7: Private and public effort at Pitt with δ=0 and δ=0.10 
 
Fig A8: Private and public effort at Pitt with δ=0 and δ=0.50 
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